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Nepal-China relations have been amicable since the establishment of diplomatic ties in 1955. Consequently, the 
image of China in Nepal’s collective imagination has remained positive. This imagination reached new heights 
when China welcomed the promulgation of Nepal's new constitution in September 2015, while India, opposed 
to the promulgation, imposed an embargo. The Indian embargo not only undermined Nepali sovereignty by 
disapproving of the contents of the new constitution, but also compelled Nepal to think about lessening its 
dependency on India. The most obvious route was to expand trans-border connectivity with China. In March 
2016, Nepal and China inked a ‘historic’ trade deal aiming to expand trans-border connectivity including a 
much-hyped trans-border railway link. Drawing broad public support, the deal had the effect of revitalising 
Nepali aspirations of coming out of an ‘India-locked’ trade and transit. This article examines opposing voices 
regarding the significance of this shift. On the one hand, there are those that embrace expansion of Nepal-China 
cross-border railway connectivity. Here, hopes are that railway connectivity will shift Nepal’s destiny away 
from dependence on India. On the other hand, many are wary that such a project is unaffordable, technically 





In March 2016, many people in Nepal cheered 
the signing of a memorandum of understanding 
(MoU) between China and Nepal with the goal 
of expanding trans-border connectivity 
including a trans-border railway following the 
five-months-long Indian embargo on Nepal 
imposed in 2015. The de facto Indian embargo 
had not only undermined Nepali sovereignty 
but also compelled the landlocked country to 
think about lessening its dependency on its 
southern neighbour. Again in June 2018, during 
Prime Minister of Nepal K. P. Sharma Oli’s 
visit to China, both countries signed an 
additional MoU on cooperation on railway 
connectivity giving the 2016 trade deal 
concrete shape. This was followed yet again by 
celebrations back in Nepal. The agreement for 
building a trans-border railway under China’s 
BRI project, which, in Nepal’s collective 
imagination has been ingrained as a ‘Chinese 
Rail’ was not the result of Nepali folk reverie. 
It rather reflects the abiding aspiration among a 
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majority of Nepali citizens of being ‘true 
sovereign’, bearing far-reaching geopolitical 
importance for both countries. The agreement 
of building the trans-border railway was signed 
in the aftermath of Indian embargo as it was 
more needed for Nepal than for China. The 
likelihood of Chinese trains passing across the 
Himalayas is the ‘most spectacular and most 
discussed’ project in Nepal (Murton & Lord 
2020: 7). Nepal’s premier visited China first in 
March 2016 following the embargo, which 
prompted Nepal to sign the MoU on trade and 
transit with China for the first time, and the 
second MoU in June 2018 to push the 2016 
MoU a step forward. Again in October 2019, 
during the visit of the Chinese president to 
Nepal, both countries reiterated to bring the 
dream of the trans-border railway into reality 
and China agreed to begin a feasibility study of 
the project. During the last four years, the 
progress on building the trans-border railway 
has been realised to the extent that it moved 
from Nepal's request to China in 2016 to 
signing of the MoU in 2018 and China being 
ready for the feasibility study in 2019.  
Nepal’s indifference to orient its people on 
the potential consequences of India-lockedness 
in the past led to the people’s apathy to think of 
seeking alternate access and pressurise the 
government for connectivity with China. For 
instance, Nepal government did nothing to 
expand or improve the standard of Araniko 
highway which was an only route to China 
since its construction in the 1960s, let alone 
expanding other road networks and railways. 
India benefitted from this apathy as its 
monopoly over Nepal's trade and transit access 
became more secured whereas Nepal’s 
transport connectivity with China remained a 
daydream for long. Nepal realised the 
constraints of being ‘India-locked’ only after 
the embargo strangled public life in 2015 by 
halting the transportation of goods. The 
government was left either submit to Indian 
embargo or expand road and railroad 
connectivity with China for future. 
Since the ascendency of Xi Jinping in the 
power in China in 2013 and launching of much-
hyped Belt and Road Initiative, many South 
Asian countries including Nepal experienced 
new form of regional power balance and 
aspired for expanding their connectivity with 
China. This change in the South Asian sub-
regional geopolitics has been prompting a turn 
on India-centric collective imagination 
because, for Nepal, the hope of trans-border 
railway seemed legitimate as soon as China 
extended its railway network to Tibetan city 
Xigatse and also planned to extend further 
south towards Nepal-China border. China's 
technological advancement in the railway made 
it possible to dream of its trains passing through 
high altitude Tibetan plateau and rough 
Himalayan ranges leaving Indian railway 
technology far behind.  
The idea of ‘imagined power corridors’ has 
also been taking shape under the project of 
trans-Himalayan transmission connectivity 
(Murton & Lord 2020) along with the idea of, 
let me call it, ‘imagined Chinese rail’ across the 
Himalayas. However, the transmission project 
has been left unattended with regard to the 
formation of Nepali collective imagination on 
Nepal-China connectivity. One of the reasons 
of this could be the fact that people could not 
establish direct link between the Indian 
embargo and the need of trans-Himalayan 
transmission line. In this backdrop, I leave the 
idea of ‘imagined power corridors’ aside and 
inquire only how Nepali collective imagination 
has taken the agreement of trans-border railway 
as a panacea for India-lockedness.  
This research is based on the analysis of 
the opinions expressed through news, 
interviews, op-eds and letter to the editor from 
the four largest national dailies (two English 
and two Nepali language dailies published from 
Nepal) having contents of Nepal-China trade 
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and transit agreement particularly trans-border 
railway connectivity. The contents chosen for 
coding have been drawn from print versions of 
these papers so the opinions expressed beyond 
the space of these papers mark the limitation of 
this research. I have included the contents for 
coding only from the four papers preceding and 
following one week from the two visits (first in 
March 2016 and second in June 2018) of 
Nepal’s prime minister to China because, 
during this period, the public opinion on the 
imagined railway project was at the peak with 
wide media coverage. The coding helped me 
conceptualise two categories of collective 
imagination: enthusiastic collective 
imagination and pessimistic collective 
imagination. 
 
Earlier efforts in trans-Himalayan connectivity 
There are quite a few historical references to 
trans-border trade, and interaction occurred 
between Nepal and Tibet even in the ancient 
times. Tibet was the trade hub for Nepal for 
long but here I concentrate on the efforts made 
only after Nepal opened its door for the outside 
world in the 1950s and the annexation of Tibet 
to China in 1951. Nepal had provided a 
gateway between South Asia, and China and 
even to Central Asia through Lhasa for free and 
unrestricted trade before East India Company 
opened the direct routes from Sikkim (Adhikari 
2015; Thapaliyal 2017). The trans-Himalayan 
trade routes passed through Nepal were vibrant 
due to Nepal’s strong trade relation with Tibet 
until the 1950s. Particularly, salt trade routes 
along the trans-Himalayan passes, such as 
Kora-La between Mustang (Nepal) and Tibet, 
were of special significance in terms of Nepal-
Tibet trade turning themselves into famous 
conduits between the two countries (Acharya 
2015; Murton, Lord & Beazley 2016; Murton 
2017). However, the lack of concerted efforts 
of modernising these passes for more efficient 
trade and transportation put China in a sort of 
geographical isolation keeping Nepal far away 
from enjoying the benefits of the Chinese 
economy until now. 
Nepal realised the consequences of 
geographical isolation with China only after the 
collapse of Rana oligarchy in Nepal in the 
1950s. The fact is that Nepal’s isolation from 
China was apparent in a speech of the Prime 
Minister of India Jawaharlal Nehru in 1950. He 
stated in the lower house of Indian Parliament, 
‘any child knows that you cannot go to Nepal 
without passing through India…’ (quoted in 
Sigdel 2016: 1). His statement displays the 
highhandedness entrenched in the mind of the 
Indian leaders about their one of the 
neighbours' geopolitical constraints. With the 
regime change from a family plutocracy to 
democracy, Nepal prioritised establishing 
diplomatic relations with its neighbouring and 
third countries as an effort to expose itself to 
the international forum. Meanwhile, Nepal 
signed the Peace and Friendship Treaty with 
China on 21 March 1960 after a decade of 
having signed a similar Treaty with India in 
1950 that brought the two countries closer than 
before. Several Indian scholars assert that 
China’s request of signing Peace and 
Friendship Treaty had been turned down by 
Nepal (see Ghoble 1992; Ramakant 1994) 
however the joint communiqué issued at the 
end of premier B. P. Koirala’s visit to China in 
1960 states that he had appreciated the Chinese 
proposal for a Treaty of Peace and Friendship. 
They also claim that Nepal had declined the 
Chinese proposal for building a road link 
between the two countries (Ghoble 1992; 
Ramakant 1994). Their claims were not 
justified as both countries signed the treaty 
under the premiership of B. P. Koirala in April 
1962 and the construction of Kathmandu-
Kodari highway proceeded. Literally, Nepal 
partly broke its dependence on India only after 
the construction of Araniko highway in the 
1960s amid Indian disapproval (Ramakant 
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1994) however the limited access to China 
through this highway could not practically 
bring Nepal out from India-lockedness. 
Nepal’s decision to construct the 
Kathmandu-Kodari highway with supports 
from China in 1961 was celebrated by the 
Nepalis, and the campaigns for raising 
symbolic funds also were launched in 
Kathmandu in June 1962 (Ray 1963: 416). This 
public celebration in Kathmandu and 
campaigns to collect funds conspicuously 
unveiled the supressed collective imagination 
of that time, which displayed the discontent of 
Nepali people with Nepal’s dependence on 
India. Another side of the coin is that, 
according to Ghoble (1992), Nepali leaders 
living in India after the king’s 1961 takeover 
condemned the agreement of constructing a 
Kathmandu-Kodari highway as it would help 
communist subversion of Nepal. Their 
condemnation was the result of the fear that the 
highway would herald the way for Chinese 
communism to Nepal, which King Mahendra 
sarcastically challenged with his famous quote, 
‘communism would not enter in Nepal in a taxi-
cab’ (Ghoble 1992: 602). Even the wariness of 
India was not less than that of the Nepali 
leaders living in India. The following excerpt 
evidently brings out the Indian wariness 
embedded in the words of Jawaharlal Nehru:  
 
In 1961, China and Nepal agreed to 
construct a 104-kilometre road from 
Kathmandu to Kodari on the China- Nepal 
border. Against this, Indian Prime Minister 
Jawaharlal Nehru expressed strong 
reservations stating that 'India's security 
interests would be adversely affected by the 
road'. He asserted that Nepal's failure to 
consult with India on the matter was a 
flagrant violation of the treaty of 1950, both 
in letter and spirit. (Quoted from Adhikari 
2012: 85) 
 
India’s disfavour with regards to Nepal-
China road connectivity rests outwardly on 
'security concerns' but in reality the 
Kathmandu-Kodari highway threatened India’s 
hegemony over Nepal and strengthened Nepal-
China attachment eventually lessening Nepal’s 
dependency on India. The construction of the 
highway was started in 1963 and opened in 
1967. This proved successful in breaching the 
trans-Himalayan barrier instilling the belief 
that connectivity with China, despite 
geographical constraints, is practically possible 
by which dependence on India can be reduced. 
From Chinese point of view, Mao Zedong’s 
comment epitomises Nepal’s need for the trans-
border highway. He told to his Nepali guests in 
August 1964, ‘once these roads are opened, 
India may be a bit more respectful towards you’ 
(quoted in Garver 1991: 957).  Mao’s remark is 
an excellent example of China’s awareness of 
Indian overbearing treatment to Nepal 
produced by the lack of Nepal-China trans-
border connectivity. 
Unlike Nepal-China trans-border 
connectivity, Nepal-India trans-border 
connectivity, which numbers more than twenty 
road networks (and few planned railway 
tracks), did not receive public celebration when 
they were opened or announced. Rather, 
expansion of trans-border connectivity with 
India usually does not invite hue and cry 
whether it be roadway or railway. While the 
discussion of the trans-border railway with 
China was at its height, India also announced a 
trans-border railway to Kathmandu from 
Raxaul (India), though the public paid no heed. 
This duality implies crucial meaning in how 
differently Nepali collective imagination 
understands trans-border connectivity with 
China and India and how Nepali nationalistic 
sentiments are built in line with China and 
India’s approach to Nepal.  
There was an effort to renovate the Kodari 
highway in May 1989 (Garver 1991) but the 
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highway has remained in a miserable condition 
due to the indifference of the post-Panchayat 
governments formed after the 1990s political 
change. Several other efforts also were initiated 
to expand road networks through other trans-
Himalayan passes but the indifference on the 
side of Nepali leadership left those efforts 
incomplete. For instance, Garver (1991) claims 
that China had expressed commitment to build 
Nepal-Tibet highway across Korala pass 
Mustang in the 1980s and a study to build 
similar highway via Tinkar pass in Darchula 
had been conducted in 1989 but the proposal 
unattended due to Nepal government’s apathy. 
Kyirong-Rasuwagadhi, the second trans-
Himalayan road was brought into operation 
following the the 2015 earthquake whereas few 
other routes including Simikot-Hilsa and 
Korala pass that connect Tibet to Nepal’s 
national road network are in pipeline now. 
There is a belief that India has been 
creating hurdles in Nepal’s efforts of expanding 
connectivity with China because the Peace and 
Friendship Treaty of 1950 gave India great 
involvement in Nepal’s internal affairs 
(Wagner 2016). In the words of Sharma (2018: 
7), ‘India raises its ears while Nepal tries to 
extend its relation with China’. The Birgunj-
Kathmandu highway, which was completed 
with supports from India in 1956, linked 
Kathmandu with India but there was no 
reporting of Chinese protest to that. 
Contrastingly, the construction of Kathmandu-
Kodari highway brought hue and cry among 
many Indian leaders and scholars. For some, 
Nepal’s dissatisfaction with India’s 
overbearing attitude led the country to 
approach China (Ghoble 1992) but for others, 
King Mahendra’s difficulties with India opened 
the door for China in Nepal (Ramakant 1994). 
Nepal’s approach to China for trans-Himalayan 
connectivity always remained as a scruple on 
Indian imagination. These arguments do not 
utterly overrule the claim that China does not 
have any interest of strategic involvement in 
Nepal.  
The Indian establishment was cautious that 
Mahendra and Birendra tried hard to bring out 
Nepal from India-lockedness by improving 
bilateral relations with China (Garver 1991). 
King Mahendra and his supporters were 
convinced that the ‘Chinese threat’ (as claimed 
by the Indians) was unreal and that China was 
basically good for the monarchy (Ray 1963). 
Not only the King and his supporters but also 
people felt the same, which was evident in the 
aforementioned celebration. An Indian scholar, 
Malik (2001: 86) writes that ‘China has had 
limited success in keeping Nepal out of India’s 
orbit.’ Among the scholars who are of critical 
towards Nepal-China intimacy, there is a 
minimum common level of anxiety that Nepal 
has used China to pressurise India since the 
1960s (Ramakant 1994), which has been 
frequently euphemised as Nepal playing ‘China 
card’. But, a Chinese scholar calls this sort of 
euphemism ‘over-simplified’ and ‘even 
superficial’ (Hong-Wei 1985). By the same 
token, Nepali scholars also categorically 
decline the Indian assessment. Pitamber 
Sharma (2016), a renowned Nepali intellectual, 
overrides Indian claim with the assertion that 
Nepal can play only ‘Nepal card’.  
An attempt to link Kathmandu and Lhasa 
through trans-border bus service in 2005 via 
Kodari route was initiated for the first time in 
2005 since the first opening of this route in 
1967. As a result, Sajha Yatayat of Nepal used 
to operate twice-weekly between Kathmandu 
and Lhasa but the bus service was discontinued 
soon after (KC & Bhattarai 2018). Still, there 
are twenty-eight trans-Himalayan passes 
between Nepal and Tibet having commercial 
and strategic interest to Nepal (Thapaliyal 
2017) though only two of them have been 
linked through the rough road network (Kodari 
and Rasuwagadhi). If these passes are 
effectively utilised, for instance, the cargo
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transportation from Lanzhou to Kathmandu 
through Xigatse, and Kyirong takes ten days, 
dramatically reducing the traditional thirty-five 
day maritime route through Indian ports (Sigdel 
2016). The proposed railway will reduce time 
and the cost of cargo transport to Nepal, and 
simultaneously can connect  the Chinese and 
Indian railway networks if, according to 
Acharya (2015), Qinghai-Tibet Railway is 
expanded to Patna in India through Nepal under 
BRI connectivity (see also Garver 1991: 975). 
The railway link will not only bridge two 
geographically distant territories but also 
reconnect two distant communities socially and 
culturally; communities once linked by the 
marital ties of Bhrikuti and Songtsen Gampo.  
 
Locating the railway in the Nepali collective 
Imagination 
The extant literature on the sociological 
interpretation of imagination deals with two 
key aspects: Individual vis-à-vis collective 
imagination. My concern in this paper is with 
the imagination of Chinese trains framed by the 
recent geo-political trajectory between Nepal, 
India and China in the backdrop of the 2015 
blockade and shared by the larger Nepali mass; 
a collective form of imagination. The term 
‘imagination’ – be it individual or collective – 
is used to refer ‘all the arbitrary evocation of 
things which are absent but which exist 
elsewhere’ (Ricoeur 1978: 4). There are 
debates on what evokes the mental image of 
something that is absent or far away. However, 
Adams (2004: 278) is of the view that social 
forces shape imagination and imagination, in 
turn, helps produce a sense of reality. This is 
evident in Nepal’s case that the nationalistic 
sentiment engendered from the consequences 
of being landlocked and sub-regional power 
imbalance have paved the way for the 
emergence of a new form of collective 
imagination which views the imagined trans-
border railway as a ‘national liberation’ project. 
For sociologists, collective imagination 
has become a useful concept to study the link 
between imaginary representations of social 
events with their existence since it represents 
the 'fantasies shared by a group of people' 
(Adams 2004: 278). A seminal work on 
collective imagination is Benedict Anderson's 
Imagined Communities (1983) derived from 
the individuals’ shared imagination of 
belonging to a nation. Imagined communities 
delineate the strength of shared imaginaries of 
the individuals in binding them in a utopian 
idea of a ‘nation’. Durkheim (1893) also 
discussed collective imagination in the form of 
‘collective consciousness’ that helps build a 
sense of solidarity among unique individuals in 
industrial societies and subsequently determine 
their social actions. Powerful imaginaries 
associated with Chinese railways emanated 
from the sufferings caused by the 2015 Indian 
embargo. These provided a rich source of 
meanings that influenced the way Nepali 
people came to intepret Nepal’s relations with 
China and India; feeding especially into 
popular sentiments of Nepali nationalism.  
In other parts of the world also, railway 
imaginations and nationalistic sentiments have 
been found inextricably linked with the past. 
For instance, a proposal for linking Europe and 
India through a railway had been put forward 
as early as in the year 1873 but could not take 
shape due to the opposition of British 
authorities (Baker 1917: 100). Subsequently, 
another proposed connection of the Russian 
and Indian railway via Afghanistan during the 
British Raj in India was also looked at 
cautiously by the British authorities both from 
strategic and commercial point of view ((Baker 
1917). The construction of railway track from 
Ulan-Ude (Soviet Union) to Ulan-Bator 
(Mangolia) and subsequent expansions to 
Beijing in the 1950s, which replaced the old 
camel caravan route from Ulan-Bator to 
Beijing, had endured pressing national interest 
 2020   |   The South Asianist 7: 82-97   |   pg. 89 
for all three countries (Petrov 1956: 471). The 
government of Mongolia had expressed 
gratitude to the Soviet government for is 
assistance in constructing the Ulan-Ude to 
Ulan-Bator track (Petrov 1056: 472). China and 
the Soviet Union had strategic collaborations in 
other trans-boundary railway tracks also 
keeping in mind their national interests. 
The railway imaginaries in everyday life 
conveyed thorough Nepali literature, songs and 
graphic presentations, for long, have been 
borrowed from British-Indian railways. 
Particularly, Nepali songs are rich in using 
various forms of railway imaginaries although 
Nepal itself does not have its functional railway 
network so far. These songs in one way or 
another reveal the deeply embedded but 
unfulfilled longing for trains running east and 
west. Thus, the Nepali collective imagination is 
rich with the images of smoke-emitting Indian 
trains, a deeply impressed imaginary that has 
remained since the introduction of the railway 
in Nepal in the first quarter of the twentieth 
century. A popular folk song of the 1970s by 
Lal Bahadur Khati ‘aru kalo railko dhuwale’ 
(lit. others turned dark-faced due to smoke-
emitting train …) appears to be a best reference 
of how the trains used to be understood by the 
Nepalis at that time. The long-standing 
discussion of constructing railway east to west 
in the Southern Nepal but not seriously 
operationalised yet has already occupied space 
in Nepalis’ imagination such as in another song 
purba paschim rail (from Chhakka Panja 
movie) released in 2016. Such collective 
imagination of railways, now, is gradually 
being turned upside down after the 2015 
blockade and, simultaneously, the image of 
Indian trains is being taken over by Chinese 
ones. Although the days of running China-
designed trains on Nepal-China trans-border 
railway are far away, imaginaries of Chinese 
trains have begun to appear in everyday life 
such as in the recently released song Chinako 
rail (lit. Chinese trains) by Saru Gautam. Now, 
the imaginaries of trains in the collective mind 
of the Nepalis have been gradually 
reconfigured by environment-friendly Chinese 
electric trains rather than by the noisy and 
smoke-emitting Indian trains. 
As mentioned above, the trajectory of the 
collective imagination around a railway in 
Nepal may be traced back to the British Raj in 
India. Altogether around 140 km railway tracks 
constructed in Nepal in the 1920s had been 
linked with Indian railway network. No new 
tracks were added, and existing ones have 
never been expanded, despite the fact that a 
comprehensive railways act was introduced in 
1963. The official shutting down of the only 
functioning Janakpur-Jaynagar track in 2014 
marked the short history of  railways in Nepal 
that gave coup de grâce to the Nepalis’ 
attachment to the trains. Now this track is being 
renovated with support from India which once 
again will reconnect Nepal with the Indian 
railway network. After the collapse of colonial 
rule in India in the 1950s, expansion of the 
railway network did not remain a priority for 
Nepal government, however, the imaginaries of 
railways and trains kept influencing everyday 
life among Nepalis. One finds folk songs, 
movies, stories and memoirs aplenty on the 
subject. The Indian trains running across north 
Indian cities Gorakhpur, Nautanwa, Raxaul and 
Jogbani carrying both the hope and despair of 
the Nepalis remained the major source of their 
imagination until now in which metaphors and 
analogies from Chinese trains were absent 
because these trains were (and still are) far from 
public access.   
My study of the opinions appeared in the 
major national dailies in Nepal reveal that the 
emergent enthusiastic collective imagination 
has a strong sense of apprehension towards 
Indian presence in Nepal, so expanding trans-
Himalayan railway connectivity is not only 
expected to reduce trade dependence with India
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and increase Chinese investment in Nepal but 
also deflect India’s political engagement on 
Nepal's internal affairs (see also Murton, Lord 
& Beazley 2016; Murton 2017; Murton & Lord 
2020). The central question is what made the 
emergence of such collective imagination 
possible? From the vantage point of Nepali 
population, the 2015 Indian embargo is 
instrumental for the emergence of pro-Chinese 
collective imagination. India imposed a de 
facto embargo against Nepal right after the 
promulgation of the new constitution in 
September 2015 expressing its dissatisfaction 
on the contents of the Constitution of sovereign 
Nepal. The embargo severely paralysed daily 
life of the Nepalis for five months but at the 
same time, it also created a powerful context to 
look for transit access towards China. It 
invigorated the prospect of Chinese train, 
which has been viewed as a panacea for age-old 
Indian highhandedness and Nepal's dependence 
on India. Moreover, the prospect of Chinese 
trains has also featured as a ‘nationalist 
infrastructural imaginaries and speculative 
geopolitical polemics’ in Nepal (Murton & 
Lord, 2020: 7). It is still uncertain whether the 
proposed trans-border railway link would be 
completed and really lessen Nepal's 
dependence on India but one thing is obvious 
that the enthusiastic collective imagination has 
already presumed its success. 
A large section of Nepalis took time to 
come out from India-centric collective 
imagination —which is pessimistic of trans-
Himalayan railway— and realise that Nepal is 
truly an India-locked country. India's 
highhandedness expressed through the 
embargo undermining Nepal’s sovereignty, 
micro-managing internal affairs and 
consequently halting daily life of the thirty 
million Nepalis in 2015 inconspicuously 
prepared the ground for them to come out from 
the India-centric imagination (see also Chatterji 
2019). Contrary to the Indian expectation from 
embargo, the Nepali perception of India 
gradually began to be questioned despite a 
small section of the Nepalis still remained 
assured with India’s ‘proactive’ role in Nepal. 
This questioning carried far-reaching 
geopolitical importance on the one hand and 
gave rise to a new collective conscience on the 
other that China is a ‘friend in need’ thereby 
raising the Nepalis’ hope to the peak. The 
imagined trans-Himalayan railway project 
necessarily has bilateral security, trade and 
transit concerns but, for the Nepali mass, it is a 
coup de grâce to the recurrent Indian 
highhandedness and a ‘panacea’ for Nepal’s 
development aspirations paralysed for long. 
If there were other factors besides the 
embargo, why did the popular imagination not 
emerge to this height before? Nepalis were 
taught that Nepal is a landlocked country 
without letting them question on the country's 
'India-lockedness’. This form of schooling 
usually blurred the elementary difference 
between being ‘landlocked’ and ‘India-locked’ 
since Nepal was viewed as merely a subset of 
Indian culture, economy and politics. This 
schooling is, by principle, faulty as it 
undermines the cultural orientation of northern 
Nepal towards China’s Tibet Autonomous 
Region, which is ‘entangled with the broader 
political economies of China’ (Murton 2017: 
254). Nepali school curriculum still traces 
hundreds of references that place Nepali 
society under the larger framework of Indian 
culture, economy and politics but very few with 
the Chinese ones nonetheless there are ample 
evidences of cultural exchange between Nepal 
and China (including Tibet) since medieval 
period. Hinduism, trade dependence and 
democratic governance are the major ones that 
have been set as the conditions responsible for 
Nepal’s destiny to tilt towards India. On the 
contrary, Nepalis were rarely taught to seek 
similar links with China. 
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The 2015 Indian embargo  and yearning for the 
Chuchche Rail  
There is little doubt that the Nepali collective 
imagination has remained thankful to China. 
The 2015 Indian embargo further pushed the 
imagination to a new height of thankfulness to 
China by letting to question on Nepal-India 
relationship, which is usually defined half-
heartedly as ‘special’ and ‘friendly’. Although 
the border embargo had been ostensibly called 
by the Tarai-based parties agitating against the 
newly promulgated constitution, the embargo 
was discreetly an Indian plan. The embargo 
gave rise to ‘widespread disenchantment in 
Nepal, forcing its leaders to seek trade 
alliances’ with China (Chalise 2016) despite 
the claim of historic and socio-cultural ties 
between Nepal and India. Even Indian proposal 
of building Raxaul-Kathmandu railway 
announced in 2017 could not compensate the 
trust-loss resulted from the embargo. This 
proposal was an epiphenomenon of the Nepal-
China trans-border railway agreement and 
guided by counter-effort of averting Nepal’s 
railway connectivity with China.  
The Nepali government ministers, even so-
called vocal youth leaders and top-rank 
political leaders appeared ambivalent to call the 
embargo an embargo (Thapa 2017). However, 
the embargo once again denied the transit rights 
of Nepal and caused to develop new national 
consensus to seek advanced connectivity with 
China (Paudel 2018). The opinions held by the 
Nepali leaders and the bureaucrats on the 
embargo were far less uncensored than the 
opinions of the laities despite the activities of 
Indian government of that time were adequate 
to call the disruption of supply an embargo. The 
pre-embedded friendly image of China in the 
collective psyche of a large section of the 
population encouraged to possess such 
uncensored responses and protest against the 
embargo.  
 
China, in particular, has always captured the 
Nepali imagination with its size, culture, 
and development, and in Nepal, there has 
always been a distant hope that China 
someday would reach out to its neighbour 
when Nepal needs it the most. (Sigdel 2016: 
1-2) 
 
The reason, perhaps, is that Nepalis have 
observed China having appeared benevolent 
whenever Indian overbearing surfaces 
nevertheless Chinese support alone was not 
sufficient to counter that. However, the Chinese 
support imparted the message for the people 
that Nepal has someone to help it whenever 
some other behaves high-handedly in spite of 
China’s underlying strategic interests. For 
instance, during the 1989 Indian embargo, 
Chinese tankers and trucks had delivered 
supplies to Kathmandu under the agreement of 
fuel and food supply (Garver 1991: 964). 
Similarly, during the 2015 embargo also, China 
followed a similar approach. On 11 March 
2016, a Chinese train loaded with Nepali 
freight left from Lanzhou for Xigatse signalling 
the significant shift in Nepal’s geo-political 
reality (Sigdel 2016). The trans-Himalayan 
railway project is a bilateral project and 
modality of investment on the project has not 
been decided yet however there is a strong 
presumption that China would provide every 
support and the project would come true.  
The 2015 border blockade disenchanted 
Nepalis from India and consequently 
pressurised the government to think over 
alternatives. As an epiphenomenon of this, both 
countries admitted Nepalis’ aspiration of 
Chinese trains by signing an agreement for 
trans-border connectivity during the trip of 
Nepal’s premier to China in March 2016. Again 
in June 2018 during the second state visit of the 
premier, both countries further agreed to co-
operate each other to expand the Xigatse-
Gyirong railway to Kathmandu in future.
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Nepal’s president’s state visit to China in April 
2019 that ended with signing the protocol of 
implementing the Transit and Transport 
Agreement further raised the hope of Chinese 
chuchche trains as the project was brought 
under the BRI. The visit of the Chinese 
president Xi Jinping to Nepal in October 2019 
ensured the Chinese support for the feasibility 
study of the railway as both parties agreed to 
conduct feasibility study of Kyirong-
Kathmandu railway. The joint press statement 
issued at the end of the visit states that 
 
[t]he two sides, while recalling the MoU 
signed between the two countries on 21 June 
2018 on Cooperation in Railway Project, 
agreed to conduct the feasibility study as 
outlined in the MoU signed on 13 October 
2019, which will lay an important 
foundation to launching the construction of 
the Cross-Border Railway. Both sides also 
reiterated their commitment to extend 
cooperation on Kathmandu-Pokhara-
Lumbini Railway Project. (Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs Nepal 2019) 
 
The pros and cons of the trans-border 
railway can be discussed from various vantage 
points but a large population in Nepal is not 
ready to accept that there are ‘side-effects’ of 
the railway too. There are others who believe 
that the ‘side effects’ cannot be ruled out utterly 
however these ‘side effects’ never outweigh the 
torture inflicted by the ‘India-lockedness’ and 
frequent border blockades. This urges us to re-
explore relevancy of the age-old saying —
Nepal: yam between the two boulders—
because employing the same looking glass for 
both boulders (India and China) cannot capture 
the present-day ground reality when regional 
power balance has appeared in favour of China. 
Those who are enthusiastic towards China 
‘presence’ in Nepal have devised several 
buzzwords, which admittedly express that 
trans-Himalayan connectivity (particularly, 
trans-Himalayan railway) is the only panacea 
for not only Nepal’s India-lockedness but also 
for its prospects of infrastructural development 
and economic growth. In addition, these 
buzzwords, such as 'beginning of new age', 
'conduit for trade', 'tectonic shift', ‘golden 
opportunity’ ‘a hen lying golden egg’, ‘magic 
stick’ and 'game-changer', illuminate also the 
Nepal’s upper hand in South Asian power 
sharing and its vocal presence in outside world. 
Against the claim that Nepal is using ‘China 
card’ against India, the buzzwords used by the 
sympathisers of the trans-Himalayan railway 
reveal their deeply entrenched thoughts that the 
railway project possesses the characteristics of 
‘national liberation’ from Indian domination 
and symbol of ‘national rejuvenation and pride’ 
(Devkota 2016: 6; Paudel 2018: para 2 & 3). In 
addition, the nationalist thrust embedded in 
these buzzwords reveal the deep interest of 
Nepal to contribute in soothing wounded 
sovereignty of the country by means of trans-
Himalayan railway.   
The India-lockedness, as an emerging 
character, is a new buzzword emerged from the 
narratives of the embargo and gradually 
substituting landlocked character of Nepal 
(Sharma 2016 ; Nepal 2016; Koirala 2016). 
This emerging character is rhetorical to 
persuade to those who are critical of Nepal’s 
need for trans-border connectivity with China. 
For those who lobby for Nepal-China railway 
connectivity, the India-lockedness has far more 
detrimental consequences than the 
landlockedness. If the trans-border railway 
project comes to be true, according to Rana 
(2013), China and India shall have opportunity 
to meet in Nepal and Nepal’s fortune of India-
lockedness will also be changed to true sense of 
landlockedness. Acharya (2018) gives the 
credit of the trans-border railway project to the 
prime minister K.P. Oli although the credit goes 
to the pressure born from the embargo.  
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The role of the imagined railway on 
Nepal’s economy needs to be discussed in 
relation with China’s investment in Nepal. 
There are discussions by several Indian and 
western scholars on this topic, which 
unanimously rely on the ‘debt trap’ theory 
(Chatterji 2019: 14). Even among Nepali 
scholars, the debt trap theory seems tried to get 
space however, so far now, the railway project 
has been viewed as a ‘most important effort’ 
and a ‘beginning of new age’ in cross-country 
connectivity (Poudel 2018), which will 
increase trade and promote tourism (Ojha 
2016). The magnification of this sort, for some, 
is contingent on the possibilities of diversifying 
trade (Pitamber Sharma 2016), expanding trade 
and employment (Neupane 2018) and reducing 
Nepal's 'near-total dependency on Indian for 
trade and transit’ (Chalise 2016: 1). China’s 
headway in strengthening connectivity with 
Nepal through the Qinghai-Tibet Railway 
which has already reached Shigatse and is 
supposed to reach Nepal’s border at Zhangmu 
(Khasa) in near future, and a proposed second 
track to Gyirong that is expected to connect 
Kathmandu has energised the magnification 
(Acharya 2015: 26 in Adhikari 2015; see also 
Holslag 2010: 646). So, the imagined trans-
Himalayan project is believed to be a game-
changer for Nepal's multidimensional 
development, geopolitics and globalisation of 
Nepali economy (Adhikari 2015; Acharya & 
Pokharel 2018; Acharya 2018; Wagle 2018). 
The ultimate reason of all this is that the 
embargo taught the Nepalis about the extent 
they are dependent on others and how the 
powerful and cynic neighbours can strangle 
them in hard times (Bhattarai 2016).  
Since this paper does not intend to deal 
with Chinese investment and its geo-political 
implication as such, the idea of ‘debt trap’ is 
restricted only with reference to the discussion 
on the railway project however, the project 
obviously falls under the larger scheme of 
Nepal-China bilateral investment or popularly 
known as ‘Chinese investment’. This imagined 
railway which is expected to pass through 
Kyirong-Rasuwagadhi corridor contextualises 
its strategic importance in Nepal-China 
relations as this corridor is the shortest route 
between China and India through Nepal (265 
kilometres from Nepal-China border to Nepal-
India border) possess historical legacy of 
linking the populations and economies of Nepal 
with those of China, Tibet, and India for 
centuries (Murton & Lord 2020: 6; see also 
Reeves 2012).   
 
Scepticism amid optimism 
Two contrasting sets of collective imagination 
—enthusiastic and pessimistic — are in 
limelight with regard to the trans-Himalayan 
railway connectivity. The first takes the 
connectivity a must for Nepal’s to enjoy its true 
sense of sovereignty and is optimistic of 
China’s support in translating it into reality. 
The second is more reluctant or pessimistic to 
Nepal's increasing connectivity towards the 
north due to the belief that Nepal’s geography, 
politics and culture naturally put the country 
closer to India than China (see also Ramakant 
1994). Even the Indian scholars seem 
convinced that it is difficult for the Nepali 
people to move away from ‘democratic ethos’ 
and to stick with a communist regime (Chatterji 
2019: 14).  
Here, two sets of collective imagination 
need to be understood parallel with two sets of 
nationalist stance namely China-centric and 
India-centric. The enthusiastic collective 
imagination which corresponds to China-
centric nationalist sentiment undermines 
Nepal’s cultural, geographical and economic 
proximity to India. Contrastingly, the 
pessimistic collective imagination which 
parallels with India-centric nationalism is of the 
view that Nepal’s inclination to India is a 
ground reality so undermining friendly relation
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with India can be costly for Nepal. These two 
opposing nationalistic sentiments have always 
made hard efforts to negate each other on which 
the trans-Himalayan railway project has added 
fuel for the last few years.  
In other parts of the world as well, the 
railways have stood either as nationalist 
projects or opposed from nationalist point of 
view. In India also, a railway project was, for 
some, equated with nationalism and nation-
state building in the past (Kerr 2003). Even the 
Chinese in the early years of the twentieth 
century were reluctant to see expanding 
railways with foreign loans as it was linked 
with their national interest (Wang 1910). Now, 
the imagined trans-Himalayan railway project 
in Nepal also is trapped in the controversial 
trajectory of two conflicting nationalistic 
sentiments. Thus the debate over the project has 
fractured Nepali nationalism into India-centric 
and China-centric. Moreover, the nationalistic 
sentiments are sharply polarised beyond the 
ethnic line in terms of the potential 
consequences of the project despite the claim 
that the Tarai-origin people are sympathetic to 
Nepal's close connection with India and the 
hill-origin population is comforting to Nepal-
China connectivity (Graver 1991; Ramakant 
1994).  
My analysis of the contents illustrates that 
the political inclination of the individuals, 
rather than ethnic, makes sense in shaping their 
stand, for or against, the railway project 
because their political agents, particularly the 
political parties, also are not truly unanimous 
on the need for trans-Himalayan railway 
connectivity. The position of the three major 
parties — Nepali Congress, Communist Party 
of Nepal, and Tarai-based parties— represent 
two sides of a pole. The Nepali Congress and 
the Tarai-based parties are more inclined to 
expand connectivity with India whereas the 
Communist Party of Nepal is more attached to 
the north, although this claim is difficult to 
substantiate without further data (see also 
Ramakant 1994). One leading national English 
daily, Republica, asserts in its editorial that in 
the ‘efforts to reach out to China or any other 
country, Nepal should be mindful that it does 
not compromise on vital Indian interest in 
Nepal’ (Republica 2016: 6). The implied 
meaning in this statement tacitly warns that 
discounting India's interest in an exchange with 
reaching out to China is not beneficial for 
Nepal.  
Those who are sceptical about the 
implications of the Nepal-China railway derive 
their arguments from the ‘debt trap’ theory. 
According to Li Tao, executive director of the 
Institute of South Asian Studies at Sichuan 
University in China, the notion of ‘debt trap’ is 
‘a figment of Western imagination’ that has 
been conspicuously coined to terrorise the 
developing countries of Asia and Africa where 
Chinese investment is soaring up under the Belt 
and Road initiative (quoted in Adhikari 2018: 
para 35). A reader of Nagarik Daily opines that 
this high-cost railway project is pushing Nepal 
into a Chinese debt trap like Sri Lanka in its 
Hambantota port project (Yadav 2018). Even 
the chief editor of Kantipur Daily is wary of the 
possibility of turning Nepal into an ‘economic 
colony’ as the project needs to borrow large 
external loan (Sharma 2018). Similarly, 
another reader of Kantipur Daily urges Nepal 
to ‘come out from railway dream’ since it is not 
the only option for the country’s progress 
(Pudasaini 2018). 
Perhaps there are political reasons for 
interpreting China’s support for Nepal: as an 
attempt to ‘invade South Asia and an endeavour 
to expand communism in the Himalaya’ 
(Paudel 2016). However, people generally take 
an optimistic view of the operationalisation of 
the railway project in the wake of the embargo, 
and the capitalisation of this optimism has 
benefited pro-Chinese sentiment in Nepal 
(Adhikari 2018). There is also, of course, a high 
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possibility of delaying the implementation of 
the project due to the geographical and 
engineering difficulties (Neupane 2018) as it 
requires high cost and advanced railway 
technologies. Similarly, propagandizing 
Chinese commitment to support (Acharya 
2016) and the relatively long distance between 
Gyirong and Chinese seaports may also hamper 
expeditious implementation of the project. 
Quite a few people are doubtful of the 
intentions of Nepali leaders and bureaucrats for 
implementing the agreement on a war footing 
(Thapa 2016; Basyal 2016). The recent visit of 
the Chinese president in October 2019 also did 
not yield any concrete package for the speedy 
operationalisation of the project besides mere 
paper commitment of starting a feasibility 
study. Despite a much-hyped expectation 
among a majority of Nepalis, the excitement 
and fanfare of welcoming Chuchche Rail began 
to dull as the incumbent Chinese ambassador 
stated that the trans-Himalayan railway is ‘a 
complex project which will take time to 
construct… [it] is very important for both the 
countries, but owing to the difficult geography, 
construction is not an easy job. It is not going 
to be ready overnight’ (Ghimire 2019: para 2). 
Her statement poured cold water on the 
enthusiastic imagination of those who are still 
waiting to see the Chinese chuchche rail in 
Kathmandu.  
 
Conclusion: the way forward 
I cannot claim that pessimistic or India-centric 
collective imagination has lost all its ground 
permanently. Rather, the possibilities of its 
resurrection are there if Nepal and China both 
fail to recognise the sentiments of the Nepali 
people, and fail to act judiciously not to let the 
enthusiastic collective imagination evaporate. 
The pessimistic collective imagination, which 
has seemed relatively weak for a while as the 
effects of the embargo are still in collective 
memory, appears comfortable in accepting 
Indian ‘hegemony’, thereby interpreting the 
railway project as a part of China’s ‘debt trap 
diplomacy’ or as expanding its ‘economic 
colony’. On the other hand, the enthusiastic 
collective imagination which is in favour of 
Nepal-China trade and transit agreement, 
accords Chinese ‘presence’ in general as 
‘natural’, and Chinese rail in particular as a 
'game-changer', 'magic stick', or the 'the 
chicken that lays golden eggs' for Nepal. 
It was difficult for both countries to come 
to an agreement over a trans-border railway 
project amid the concerns of India. But 
sincerity, expressed by both governments for 
Nepal's need for third-country access via trans-
Himalayan connectivity, worked out generally 
well. On the part of China, it is not sure if there 
was public pressure for the expansion of trans-
Himalayan connectivity, but in Nepal pressure 
born from the public in the wake of the 
embargo was instrumental for the government 
in signing the agreement with China. Even the 
electoral success of K P Oli-led former CPN-
UML in the parliamentary election held in 
November-December 2017 was interpreted in 
connection with his strategic mobilisation of 
the collective expectation of Chinese trains to 
attract the electorates. This implies the gravity 
of the enthusiastic collective imagination on the 
trans-Himalayan railway which needs to be 
taken seriously by both countries. 
The enthusiastic collective imagination 
should be taken as a strength in regards to 
Nepal-China bilateral relations. It strongly 
underpins the inter-governmental efforts and 
helps legitimise bilateral cooperation and 
investment efforts in everyday life by ensuring 
public ownership over them. So, the task of 
defending this is the responsibility of Nepal and 
China together. Now the emphasis should be 
laid on promoting people-to-people interaction 
as it is the only means to reinforce enthusiastic 
collective imagination so that both countries 
may realise the urgency of the project. If this
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optimism fragments, the friendly relations at 
the government level, established through 
documents and signatures, will fail to give a 
sense of true friendship. Moreover, if the the 
project fails to materialise, it will create a 
vacuum for people-level trust-deficit. In this 
case, it will shatter Nepali dreams of emerging 
from India-lockedness and enjoying their true 
sense of sovereignty. 
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